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Abstract
In cognitive archeology, theories of cognition are used to guide inter-
pretation of archeological evidence. This process provides useful feedback
on the theories themselves. The attempt to accommodate archeological
data helps shape ideas about how human cognition has evolved and thus—
by extension—how the modern form functions. But the implications that
archeology has for cognitive science particularly relate to traditional pro-
posals from the field involving modular decomposition, symbolic thought
and the mediating role of language. There is a need to make a connection
with more recent approaches, which more strongly emphasize information,
probabilistic reasoning and exploitation of embodiment. Proposals from
cognitive archeology, in which evolution of cognition is seen to involve a
transition to symbolic thought need to be realigned with theories from cog-
nitive science that no longer give symbolic reasoning a central role. The
present paper develops an informational approach, in which the transi-
tion is understood to involve cumulative development of information-rich
generalizations.
1 Introduction
Our commitment to the Darwinian theory of evolution means we normally hope
to understand the evolution of a species in terms of well-evidenced ‘survival of
the fittest’ events. In the case of human evolution, unfortunately, there are
significant difficulties in achieving this goal. Part of the problem is the fact
that, in this context, it is behavioural changes that are particularly significant.
Given these may create little or no trace in the archeological record, the difficulty
of inferring relevant transitions is inevitably increased.
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Coming to grips with this problem, archeologists have deployed the approach
of cognitive archeology (e.g. Plotkin, 1982; Donald, 1991; Mellars, 1991; Mellars
and Gibson, 1996; Dunbar, 1996; Renfrew and Zubrow, 1993; Mithen, 1996a;
Renfrew, 2007). In this approach, theories of cognitive functionality come to
guide interpretation of physical evidence. The adoption of a lithic technology in
a particular context, for example, might be explained by demonstrating that the
cognitive skills involved are enabled by activities pursued in an immediately pre-
ceding context. Application of cognitive theory becomes a way of constraining
and shaping the interpretation placed on the emergence of particular tool-use.
The approach has proved useful as a means of explaining curiosities in the
evolutionary record, e.g., the fact that ‘the most dramatic developments in
human cognition seem to have occurred without any concomitant increase in
brain size.’ (Bickerton, 1996, p. 44). It has also been particularly effective
for explaining the interval between emergence of anatomically modern humans
around 200,000 years ago, and the emergence, somewhat later, of significant lev-
els of characteristically modern human behaviour. The earliest known artistic
artefact—the incised slab of shale from the Blombos Cave—is dated to more
than 70,000 years ago (Henshilwood et al., 2002). But the torrent of art, tech-
nology, ritual and symbolism that is deemed the distinctive signature of Home
sapiens is seen to develop momentum somewhat later, with the change being
particularly dramatic at the Middle/Upper Paleolithic transition in western Eu-
rope (Henshilwood and Marean, 2003). The question is then what explains the
delay? Renfrew poses it thus. ‘If the genetic basis of the new species is differ-
ent from that of earlier hominids, and of decisive significance, why is that new
inherent genetic capacity not more rapidly visible in its effects, in what is seen
in the archeological record?’ (Renfrew, 2008, p. 84-85). Renfrew terms this the
‘sapient paradox’.
2 Approaches to the sapient paradox
One way to deal with the paradox is to posit the occurrence of a mutation in
human DNA, that had the effect of establishing a more sophisticated cognitive
engagement with the world, but without any accompanying change in anatomy
(e.g. Klein, 1999, 2001). In proposals of this type, language may be seen to play
an important, mediating role (e.g. Bickerton, 1996). But such schemes remain
controversial, given the relatively sparse evidence for symbol-oriented behaviour
prior to 50,000 years ago and the lack of evidence for any ‘highly advantageous
neurological change’ after that date (Henshilwood and Marean, 2003, p. 630).
Cognitive archeology is able to produce more graduated accounts, however.
Rather than assuming the occurrence of some critical event which had the effect
of ‘switching on’ modern cognition, structured processes of development can be
envisaged that had the same effect over a longer period.
Taking the transition to modern cognition to entail the adoption of an in-
creasingly symbolizing mode of thought (Renfrew, 2007), such accounts often
explain the ‘hold-up’ in terms of sequential constraints. Domain integration can
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be the critical concept here. If development of symbolic thought facilitates (or is
facilitated by) integration of domain-specific competences, it is clear the latter
must precede the former. The necessity of passing through two distinct phases
of development can then be used to explain why emergence of modern cognitive
sophistication seems to have been delayed (Rozin and Schull, 01988).
Prominent among accounts of this type is Mithen’s ‘cathedral’ model. In
this theory (Mithen, 1993), the domain-specific entities are understood to be
specialized intelligences, along the lines of (Gardner, 1993). Seeing these as
broadly analogous to the chapels of a cathedral, Mithen equates general intelli-
gence with the cathedral’s nave. It is a central area through which the multiple
intelligences come to be connected. The ultimate effect is a unified, cognitively
fluid system of general intelligence (Mithen, 1996b, p. 72).
Mithen’s account particularly invokes Tooby and Cosmides’ evolutionary
model, in which specialized cognitive modules are analogized with the tools
of a Swiss army knife (Tooby and Cosmides, 1989, 1992). It also references
Fodor’s (1983) ‘Modularity of Mind’. This proposal envisages mental architec-
ture to comprise a large number of informationally-encapsulated ‘input systems’
under the management of an integrative reasoning system. Fodor commits to
this medium being an inner, compositional language—the so-called ‘language of
thought’. Mithen is more agnostic on this point, although stressing the degree
to which integration must involve processes of analogy and metaphor (Mithen,
2006).
A key advantage of Mithen’s account is its ability to address the sapient para-
dox. It becomes possible to see why a critical development in the evolution of
modern human cognition might have involved no gross change in anatomy. The
transition can be seen to have been more a change in ‘software’ than ‘hardware’.
Delays in cognitive emergence are then more easily comprehended. Indeed, by
developing more structured accounts of the changes involved, it is possible to
reach a point where the time allowed seems almost too short.
In Donald’s (1991) account, for example, the evolution of modern cognition
is understood to involve a progression through four distinct cultures of repre-
sentation. The initial culture is episodic representation. The main entity here
is a kind of situational snapshot; reliance on it significantly limits possibilities
for engaging with temporally-extended and otherwise relational phenomena.
Episodic representations are then seen to be superceded by mimetic representa-
tions. These are language-like generalizations, but mediated by non-linguistic
forms of expression such as mime and body language. Exploitation of temporal
and relational phenomena becomes a possibility.
In the subsequent culture of mythic representation, we see emergence of
language itself, with expression in mythical entities and traditions. The final
phase in the sequence is then characterized by use of external symbol storage
(e.g., written representation) and theoretic/scientific culture. Mapping these
four cultures onto the archeological record then addresses the sapient paradox in
a more fine-grained way. The effect is accounted for in terms of the progression
through mimetic and mythic stages of representation, within an overarching
journey from episodic to theoretic/scientific culture.
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It is an important advantage of these cognitively-informed theories that they
make it easier to understand why there may have been a delay between appear-
ance of modern human anatomy and modern cognitive sophistication. But they
are not without their problems. Allowing cognitive evolution to proceed in a
way that is largely disconnected from anatomical change deals with the sapient
paradox; but it also tends to eliminate constraints on absolute timing. The
question arises of how long we should expect such progressions to take. Cog-
nitive science’s reliance on computer simulation means it is not well equipped
to give an answer (Boden, 2006). Indeed, the time-scale of most simulation
work allows that Donald’s four-stage progression might be accomplished in a
relatively modest number of generations. Mithen’s might even be completed in
a single lifetime. A question mark remains hanging over the issue of timing,
therefore.
From the present point of view, the more pressing problem with these ac-
counts relates to their terms of reference. Evolution of modern cognition is seen
to be a process through which domain-specific functionalities come to be inte-
grated through the operations of a centralized system. This is understood to be
either dependent on, or somehow constituent of processes of symbolic reasoning.
Development of this style of reasoning is generally assumed to interact closely
with evolution of language. But the connection is difficult to discern, partly
because language seems somewhat overpowered with regard to its initial appli-
cation (Dunbar, 1996), and partly because it is extremely hard to disentangle
cause and effect (Hauser et al., 2002).
As McBrearty and Brooks note, ‘Abstract and symbolic behaviors imply
language, but it is doubtful that the point at which they can first be detected
coincides with the birth of language’ (McBrearty and Brooks, 2000, p. 486).
Henshilwood and Marean suggest the latter is likely to have come first, noting
the ‘capacity for language probably existed in humans well before it was man-
ifested in material culture’ (Henshilwood and Marean, 2003, p. 635). But the
degree of integration between evolution of symbolic reasoning and evolution of
language is not presently of concern. It is the implication of symbolic reasoning
being fundamental in modern cognition that is more significant.
The difficulty is that this way of conceiving cognition is increasingly out of
step with developments in cognitive science. The field has changed significantly
in the last two decades. Commitments from earlier years that have recently
been revised (and in some cases overturned) include some of those that particu-
larly inform proposals from cognitive archeology. Where cognitive science once
emphasized factors of modular decomposition (e.g. Newell and Simon, 1972;
Johnson-Laird, 1983; Fodor, 1983; Haugeland, 1985), it now more strongly
stresses efficient coding and information use (e.g. Eliasmith, 2007; Griffiths,
2009; Friston, 2010). Where it once emphasized the importance of representa-
tional multiplicity and centralized integration (e.g. Anderson, 1983; Gregory,
1984) it now gives as much weight to exploitation of scaffolding and embodiment
(e.g. Wheeler, 1994; Beer, 2000). And where it once committed to symbolic
reasoning being the medium of high-level integration (e.g. Marr, 1977; Boden,
1977; Winston, 1984) it increasingly recognizes the greater potential (and neural
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plausibility) of probabilistic forms (e.g. Doya et al., 2007; Chater and Oaksford,
2009; Clark, 2008).
Conceptions of cognition in which symbolic reasoning takes charge are in-
creasingly questioned (Thelen and Smith, 1993; Ballard, 1991). Indeed, they
are often seen to be philosophically flawed (Wheeler, 2005). The essence of the
charge is that they are ideomorphic, i.e., dependent on conceptual projection.
Where a set of ideas are found to deal effectively with the behaviour of a sys-
tem, there is the temptation to assume they must pick out physical or functional
constituents. In practice, there may be no correlation whatsoever. Yet any such
scheme will seem to be explanatory purely as a result of the deployment of
familiar concepts.
A familiar illustration of the effect is provided by neuroscientific work on lan-
guage. In the history of this area, we see how conceptions of functionality came
to shape ideas about mechanisms of implementation. Dominating the process
is the idea of language as a distinct cognitive functionality. Investigations natu-
rally came to focus on the ‘faculty’ responsible. With the actions of this faculty
conceptualized to connect language comprehension with speech production, it
seemed particular areas of the brain must be involved. Investigations proceed-
ing accordingly then generated evidence which seemed to place the faculties in
distinct areas of the brain: comprehension came to be located in Broca’s area,
speech production in Wernicke’s area. Ongoing work, however, has revealed a
far less simplified arrangement. In fact, these areas have come to be recognized
as ‘convenient fictions’ (Donald, 1991, p. 55). In Pinker’s view ‘no one really
knows what either Broca’s area or Wernicke’s area is for.’ (Pinker, 1994, p.
311).
Much the same story can be told in the case of cognitive science’s involve-
ment with symbolic reasoning. This way of conceptualizing cognition has proved
effective over more than two millenia. It naturally came to shape ideas of im-
plementation. The human cognitive system came to be viewed as a machine
for executing symbolic reasoning (cf. Newell and Simon, 1976; Boden, 2006).
But with no neurological evidence to give support, the account lacked a firm
foundation. In the event, the problems with it came rapidly to light. Research
in artificial intelligence demonstrated convincingly that symbolic reasoning ma-
chines cannot replicate the power and fluidity of human cognition (Clark, 1997;
Beer, 2000; Wheeler, 2005). Most researchers in cognitive science have then
moved on to other proposals. Almost all now emphatically reject the possibility
of there being any ‘executive center’ for performance of symbolic reasoning in
the brain (e.g. Clark, 1997, p. xiii). As Donald observed two decades ago, ‘there
do not appear to be any good neuroanatomical candidates for an unconstrained
central processor’ (Donald, 1991, p. 54).
Other ways of understanding this outcome can also be framed. The diffi-
culty of obtaining cognitive functionality from mechanised symbolic reasoning
can be seen to arise from the ‘frame problem’, for example. This particularly
highlights the effects of increasing complexity. As reasoning processes becomes
more complex, interactions between separate thread of reasoning build up to
the point where inferential functionality breaks down completely. Symbolic rea-
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soning machines can reproduce cognitive functionality in simple ‘toy’ situations.
But the fluidity of functionality we associate with human cognition remains out
of reach.
A close connection also exists between ideomorphic and homuncular expla-
nation. The effectiveness of conceptualizing system behaviour in terms of the
actions of an intelligent homunculus become the basis for seeing the homunculus
as a real constituent of the system. But if the homunculus is imaginary (as it
invariably is) such explanations ultimately collapse. A third way of understand-
ing the failure of accounts invoking symbolic reasoning is to draw attention to
the degree to which they are implicitly homuncular. Donald particularly em-
phasizes this in connection with Fodor’s ‘Modularity of Mind’. Fodor envisages
a centralized reasoning system taking steps to integrate information emerging
from specialized input systems. But as Donald warns, ‘there is a not-so-covert
homunculus lurking in all such models’ (Donald, 1991, p. 364).
The difficulty confronting the relationship between cognitive science and
cognitive archeology then comes into focus. There is divergence on the assumed
substrate of human cognition. Taking symbolic reasoning to be the means of
integrating domain-specific intelligences entails that this process is functionally
critical. But for cognitive scientists, that assumption has been the path to
manifestly dysfunctional models of mechanism. For these researchers, symbolic
reasoning cannot be a functionally critical constituent of human cognition.
Is there any way to bridge this gulf? The present paper argues that it can be
done by revising definitions a little. In particular, we need to adopt a broader
interpretation for the process that cognitive archeology deems to mediate the
transition to a ‘symbolic style of thought’. While it seems this must involve
acquiring the ability to execute processes of symbolic reasoning, that is not
the case. In fact, there is an interpretation that eliminates the assumption
altogether. The point can be illustrated using an example.
A Tale of Two Forecasters
Imagine we have two individuals F1 and F2 that compete to produce the best
weather forecasts for a certain country. F1 relies on perceptual cues obtained
from direct observation of the environment. These forecasts exploit simple as-
sociations between perceptual patterns and meteorological outcomes. A grey
cloud cresting the horizon directly upwind is taken to be an indication that it is
likely to rain in the next 15 minutes. Obtaining this perceptual cue, F1 forecasts
a strong probability of rain in the immediate vicinity within 15 minutes. Other
forecasts are generated in much the same way.
Wanting to achieve a greater level of precision than F1, F2 decides to deploy
an approach based on symbolic reasoning. Borrowing the standard symbols for
representing centres of high and low pressure, F2 develops a way of classifying
warm and cold fronts, such that the location of any front can be predicted to
reasonable accuracy up to 24 hours ahead of time. Using this system, F2 is able
to produce highly accurate forecasts covering the entire country purely through
inferential reasoning.
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Not to be outdone, F1 decides that a change of strategy is in order. Un-
derstanding that F2’s remarkable forecasts are obtained through symbolic rea-
soning, F1 takes steps to adopt the same strategy. Symbols are introduced for
purposes of representing different cloud colourings. F1 establishes one symbol
for threatening grey clouds, another for fluffy white ones, and so on. Further
symbols are introduced to represent different locations and types of outcome:
rain, sun, fog etc. With all of this in place, F1 is able to produce forecasts
purely through symbolic reasoning, just like F2. Unfortunately, F1’s forecasts
turn out to be no better than they were before.
The moral of the story is probably self-evident. Adopting the strategy of
symbolic reasoning does not itself guarantee any improvement in efficacy. What
makes a difference is the precision and power of the generalizations that are
brought into play. F2’s forecasts are better than F1’s due to deploying gen-
eralizations that are both more predictive and more precisely defined. F1’s
adoption of symbolic reasoning makes no difference because there is no change
in the generalizations referenced. Examining the reasons for F2’s supremacy
over F1, we then arrive at a different understanding of what the transition to
symbolic thought may involve. We do not have to assume it involves increasing
utilization of symbol processing. We can see it has involving use of increasingly
predictive, increasingly well-defined and increasingly broad generalizations.
In a sense, this is just another way of saying what is meant by ‘more sym-
bolic’, of course. Generalizations with these characteristics are at a higher level
of abstraction, and thus closer to the ideal of formal symbolism, in which signs
are fully divorced from content (Casson, 1981). But it does get around a major
difficulty with the idea of symbol usage. As Donald notes (1991), if we assume
there is literal symbol usage in human cognition, we need to explain how refer-
ential meaning is established. It cannot be done on the basis of more symbolic
processing, on pain of infinite regress. Allowing symbol usage to be identified
with deployment of predictively powerful generalizations avoids the problem.
This way of conceptualizing the transition to a symbolic style of thought
has a close relation with Bickerton’s proposal for a transition from ‘on-line’
to ‘off-line’ thinking (Bickerton, 1996), and also to Deacon’s (1997) proposal
for a progression from indexical to symbolic representation. But the proposed
interpretation has the advantage of getting away from any implication of the
denouement being emergence of explicit symbolic reasoning.
3 Information-rich generalization
The framework of information theory (Shannon, 1948; Wiener, 1948; Shannon
and Weaver, 1949) can be used to give a more formal statement of the proposal.
The key principle of this framework is that the information content of an event
is the amount of uncertainty it resolves. Given a way of measuring uncertainty
(e.g., the entropy formula), we can then quantify the amount of information
contained in a message, signal or event. The approach can also be used to
explain the advantage that is acquired from use of more abstract generalizations,
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however. Generalizations which predict a broader range of phenomena with a
greater level of precision necessarily resolve more uncertainty. They can thus
be seen to generate more information. This is one part of the benefit obtained.
There is a second aspect. More abstract generalizations have fewer and more
precisely defined criteria. If we take satisfaction of these to be the events that
convey the relevant information, it is clear that the fewer there are, the greater
must be their average information value. More abstract generalizations thus
benefit from making broader and more precise predictions, but also from having
more specific criteria. The transition to a more symbolic style of thought can
then be seen to be the adoption of increasingly information-rich generalizations,
where these are understood to have relatively greater breadth, precision and
criterial specificity.
Recognizing this triad of informational benefits, we obtain a more formal
conception of what the transition to symbolic thought may involve. Rather
than seeing it as the innovation of symbolic reasoning, we can see it as the
cumulative adoption of increasingly information-rich generalizations. The main
advantage of the idea is that it more easily accommodates modern frameworks
of cognitive science, particularly where they have an informational basis.
The relation between emergence of symbolic styles of thought and integra-
tion of domain-specific intelligences is then called into question, however. The
former process is often held to be critically implicated in the latter, although
usually with some flexibility over flow of control, i.e., acceptance that it might
be integration facilitating the transition, or the other way around.1 Bringing
the informational interpretation to bear, it becomes possible to see how the two
processes might be one and the same. As noted, the pursuit of information-rich
generalizations can mediate the transition to a symbolic style of thought. But
it is no less plausibly the vehicle for forming cross-domain generalizations. It
is, after all, a generalization mechanism. Domain integration may thus be pro-
gressed by the same underlying process that produces the transition to a more
symbolic style of thought.
How well this unification of processes can be reconciled with other accounts
for the symbolic transition, such as (Bickerton, 1996) and (Deacon, 1997), needs
further investigation. It does seem reasonably consistent with Donald’s rep-
resentation cultures, however. As noted, Donald proposes evolution of mod-
ern cognition passes through four distinct cultures of representation: episodic,
mimetic, mythic and theoretic/scientific. But these form a sequence in which
later cultures must deploy constructs built on previously constructed represen-
tations. Since what is represented in later culture must then generalize what is
represented in earlier cultures, it is possible that the process is also mediated
by generalization. To this degree, Donald’s proposal is broadly consistent with
the notion of an underlying, information-seeking generalization mechanism.
One question then arising involves the oscillations in cognitive orientation
1Relevant to this is evidence favouring the significance of cognitive structure in evolution
of language. As Dunbar notes, it is ‘more likely that language is parasitic on thought, than it
has the kind of grammatical structure we give it (the subject-verb-object form) because that
is how we naturally think (Dunbar, 1996, p. 105).
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that are seen in different phases of human evolution. Cognitive development (in
human ancestry) between 100 million and 10 million years ago seems to move
in the direction of a more generalized type of intelligence. A period of approxi-
mately 10 million years then ensues in which developments seem to move in the
opposite direction—towards a more specialized type of intelligence. Finally, in
the era of Homo sapiens, the trend is reversed again, with developments seem-
ing to move in the direction of more generalized intelligence (Mithen, 1996b,
p. 242). How can this alternation be squared with the assumption of a single
process?
Again, informational notions can be of use. Recognizing generalization to
be a cumulative operation—subsequent constructions must build on and refer-
ence prior constructions—we see how the pursuit of informational reward might
produce the effect of increasing specialization at certain stages. Where we see
construction of a generalization that is relatively more specific than the context
allows, preference for the construction might be based on it yielding greater
reward. Nothing rules this out. Indeed, adoption of more specific criteria will
generally increase average information among criterial events. Pursuit of infor-
mational reward thus has the potential to produce movement in the direction
of either increasing specificity or increasing generality. Cognitive developments
which seem to prioritize generality in one phase, and specificity in another might
then arise from contextual factors rather than from any fundamental ‘polarity
shift’ in the process itself.
The informational proposal does have its problems, of course. One drawback
is its inability to address the issue of absolute timing. Proposals from cognitive
archeology seek to explain the delay in emergence of modern human sophistica-
tion in terms of scheduling requirements and constraints, e.g., the necessity of
domain-specific learning preceding integration of the knowledge acquired. But
there remains the question of absolute duration. There seems no way to pin
down the amount of time a particular sequence should take. The informational
approach does no better on this point. Taking the underlying mechanism to
be information-seeking generalization, the amount of time required to complete
any particular operation remains largely unconstrained. On the other hand, by
eschewing commitments to symbolic reasoning and modular decomposition, we
increase the possibility of bringing other theories to bear in resolving the issue.
Further work is required to get more insight on this.
4 Concluding comments
In Wynn’s (1985) view, archeology has ‘the potential to make serious contribu-
tions to the study of intelligence’ (p. 32). Mithen also stresses the point, ob-
serving that ‘if you wish to know about the mind, do not ask only psychologists
and philosophers: make sure you also ask an archeologist’ (Mithen, 1996b, p.
259). The sentiment surely applies in spades to cognitive science, which has long
suffered from lack of empirical data to constrain an abundance of theory. But
interactions between cognitive archeology and cognitive science face the problem
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of increasingly divergent terms of reference. Cognitive archeologists particularly
emphasize a gradual transition to symbolic styles of thought, and the mediating
role symbolic reasoning can play in cross-connecting domain-specific modules of
intelligence. Recent approaches in cognitive science, on the other hand, stress
non-symbolic (i.e., probabilistic) forms of reasoning and move away from no-
tions of modular decomposition based on abstract notions of mechanism. The
problem is how to bring these diverging trends together.
Behind the differing terms of reference there is substantial continuity of con-
ceptualization, fortunately. The transition to symbolic thought need not involve
wholesale adoption of explicit, symbolic processing. It may be mediated by the
pursuit of informationally rewarding generalizations. On this basis, evolution
may have been able to cross what Donald describes as the ‘abyss from non-
symbolic to symbolic representation’ (Donald, 1991, p. 368) in relatively easy,
information-seeking steps. Ideas relating to processes of module integration
(as envisaged by Mithen), or about cultures of representation (as envisaged by
Donald), become more easily related to current concepts of probabilistic repre-
sentation and efficient coding (Friston, 2010). It also becomes possible to see
how theories from different domains of investigation might ultimately come be
unified under the mathematical principles of information theory.
The proposal does not dispute the salience of a symbolic style of thought. It
contends only that symbolism is on a continuum. Instead of there being a rigid
distinction between ‘what is symbolic’ and ‘what is not symbolic’, concepts are
seen to become relatively more symbolic, as they become more abstract, more
precisely defined and more broad in generalization. The proposal also does
not intend to downplay the potential significance of language. As Tattersall
comments ‘it’s as certain as anything inferential can be that language and the
mental abilities directly associated with it loom large indeed behind the capacity
to think, on which our species’ success is founded (Tattersall, 1998, p. 227).
Nothing in the present proposal contradicts that idea. Taking the transition
to symbolic thought to involve information-oriented generalization is in no way
inconsistent with evolution of language being intertwined. (This might be in
the manner envisaged by Carruthers (2002).) It is more a functional reduction
of the mechanisms assumed to mediate the process.
Finally, there is no particular commitment on chronology. The present
evidence seems to favour emergence of some symbolic activity after 70,000
years ago, with a significant eruption of art, technology and other forms of
symbolically-mediated activity after 40,000 years ago. But the accuracy or oth-
erwise of these dates has no implications for what is presently proposed. The
envisaged mediation for the transition is consistent with it having got underway
somewhat later, or perhaps considerably earlier. Indeed, the ‘presumptive evi-
dence that boats were being built by Homo erectus some 500,000 years ago’ for
purposes of making sea voyages around Indonesia (Renfrew, 2007, p. 139) can
only suggest (to anyone who has embarked on a similar undertaking) application
of fairly sophisticated styles of thought within that era.
10
References
Anderson, J. R. (1983). The Architecture of Cognition. Cambridge, Mass:
Harvard University Press.
Ballard, D. H. (1991). Animate vision. Artificial Intelligence, 48 (pp. 57-86).
Beer, R. D. (2000). Dynamical approaches to cognitive science. Trends in
Cognitive Sciences, 4 (pp. 91-99).
Bickerton, D. (1996). Language and Human Behavior. London: UCL Press.
Boden, M. (1977). Artificial Intelligence and Natural Man (1st edition). Has-
socks: Harvester Press.
Boden, M. A. (2006). Mind as Machine: A History of Cognitive Science (Vol.
1 and 2). Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Carruthers, P. (2002). The cognitive functions of language. Brain and Behav-
ioral Sciences, 25 (pp. 652-726).
Casson, E. (1981). Language, Culture, and Cognition. New York: Maxmillan.
Chater, N. and Oaksford, M. (2009). Precis of bayesian rationality: the prob-
abilistic approach to human reasoning. Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32
(pp. 69-120).
Clark, A. (1997). Being There: Putting Brain, Body and World Together Again.
Cambridge, MA: MIT Press.
Clark, A. (2008). Supersizing the Mind: Embodiment, Action and Cognitive
Extension. Oxford: Oxford University Press.
Deacon, T. W. (1997). The Symbolic Species: The Co-evolution of Language
and the Brain. New York: W.W. Norton & Company, Inc.
Donald, M. (1991). Origins of the Modern Mind: Three Stages in the Evolution
of Culture and Cognition. Cambridge, Mass: Harvard University Press.
Doya, K., Ishii, S., Rao, R. P. N. and Pouget, A. (2007). The Bayesian Brain:
Probabilistic Approaches to Neural Coding. MIT Press.
Dunbar, R. (1996). Grooming, Gossip, and the Evolution of Language. Cam-
bridge, MA: Harvard University Press.
Eliasmith, C. (2007). How to build a brain: from function to implementation.
Synthese, 159 (pp. 373388).
Fodor, J. (1983). The Modularity of Mind. Cambridge, MA: The MIT Press.
Friston, K. (2010). The free-energy principle: a unified brain theory? Nat. Rev.
Neurosci, 11, No. 2 (pp. 127-138).
11
Gardner, H. (1993). Multiple Intelligences: The Theory in Practice. New York:
Basic Books.
Gregory, R. L. (1984). Mind in Science. Harmondsworth, Middlesex: Peregrine
Books.
Griffiths, T. L. (2009). The strengths of - and some of the challenges for bayesian
models of cognition (commentary on oaksford and chater, 2009, precis of
bayesian rationality). Behavioral and Brain Sciences, 32 (pp. 89-90).
Haugeland, J. (1985). Artificial Intelligence: The Very Idea. Cambridge, Mass:
MIT Press.
Hauser, M. D., Chomsky, N. and Fitch, W. T. (2002). The faculty of language:
what is it, who has it, and how did it evolve? Science, 198 (pp. 15691579).
Henshilwood, C. S. and Marean, C. W. (2003). The origin of modern human
behavior: critique of the models and their test implications. Current An-
thropology, 44, No. 5.
Henshilwood, C. S., D’Errico, F., Yates, R., Jacobs, Z., Tribillo, C., Duller,
G. A. T., Mercier, N., Sealy, J. C., Valladas, H., Watts, I. and Wintle,
A. G. (2002). Emergence of modern human behaviour: middle stone age
engravings from south africa. Science, 295 (pp. 1278-80).
Johnson-Laird, P. (1983). Mental Models: Towards a Cognitive Science of Lan-
guage, Inference, and Consciousness. London: Cambridge University Press.
Klein, R. G. (1999). The Human Career: Human Biological and Cultural Ori-
gins. Chicago: University of Chicago Press.
Klein, R. G. (2001). Fully modern humans. In Feinman and Price (Eds.),
Archeology at the Millenium (pp. 109-135). New York: Plenum.
Marr, D. (1977). Artificial intelligence: a personal view. Artificial Intelligence,
9 (pp. 37-48).
McBrearty, S. and Brooks, A. S. (2000). The revolution that wasn’t: a new
interpretation of the origin of modern human behavior. Journal of Human
Evolution, 39 (pp. 453-563).
Mellars, P. and Gibson, K. (1996). Modelling the Early Human Mind Symbol-
ism, Language and the Neanderthal Mind. Cambridge UK: McDonald Inst.
Archeol. Res.
Mellars, P. M. (1991). Cognitive changes and the emergence of modern humans
in europe. Cambridge Archeological Journal, 1, No. 1 (pp. 63-76).
Mithen, S. (1993). From domain specific to generalized intelligence: a cognitive
interpretation of the middle/upper paleolithic transition. In Renfrew and
Zubrow (Eds.), The Ancient Mind: Elements of Cognitive Archeology (pp.
29-39). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
12
Mithen, S. (1996a). The Prehistory of the Mind: A Search for the Origins of
Art, Religeon and Science. Thames and Hudson.
Mithen, S. (1996b). The Prehistory of the Mind: A Search for the Origins of
Art, Religeon and Science (Pheonix paperback edition). Pheonix.
Mithen, S. (2006). The Singing Neanderthals: The Origins of Music, Language,
Mind and Body. Pheonix.
Newell, A. and Simon, H. (1972). Human Problem Solving. Englewood Cliffs,
NJ: Prentice Hall.
Newell, A. and Simon, H. (1976). Computer science as empirical inquiry: sym-
bols and search. Communications of the ACM, 19, No. 3 (pp. 113-126).
Pinker, S. (1994). The Language Instinct: The new Science of Language and
Mind. The Penguin Press.
Plotkin, H. C. (1982). Evolutionary epistemology and evolutionary theory. In
Plotkin (Ed.), Learning, Development and Culture: Essays in Evolutionary
Epistemology. Chichester: Wiley.
Renfrew, C. and Zubrow, E. B. W. (1993). The Ancient Mind: Elements of
Cognitive Archeology (pp. 29-39). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
Renfrew, C. (2007). Prehistory: The Making of the Human Mind. Weidenfeld
& Nicolson.
Renfrew, C. (2008). Prehistory: The Making of the Human Mind (paperback
edition). Phoenix.
Shannon, C. and Weaver, W. (1949). The Mathematical Theory of Communi-
cation. Urbana, Illinois: University of Illinois Press.
Shannon, C. E. (1948). A mathematical theory of communication. Bell System
Technical Journal, 27 (pp. 379-423 and 623-656).
Tattersall, I. (1998). Becoming Human: Evolution and Human Uniqueness.
New York: Harcourt Brace.
Thelen, E. and Smith, L. (1993). A Dynamic Systems Approach to the Devel-
opment of Cognition and Action. Cambridge, Mass: MIT Press.
Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. (1989). Evolutionary psychology and the generation
of culture, part I theoretical considerations. Ethology and Sociobiology, 10
(pp. 29-49).
Tooby, J. and Cosmides, L. (1992). The psychological foundations of culture.
In Barkow, Cosmides and Tooby (Eds.), The Adapted Mind (pp. 19-136).
New York: Oxford University Press.
13
Wheeler, M. (1994). For Whom The Bell Tolls? The Roles of Representation
and Computation in the Study of Situated Agents. School of Cognitive and
Computing Sciences, University of Sussex.
Wheeler, M. (2005). Reconstructing the Cognitive World: The Next Step. MIT
Press.
Wiener, N. (1948). Cybernetics. New York: Wiley.
Winston, P. (1984). Artificial Intelligence (2nd edn). Reading, Mass: Addison-
Wesley.
Wynn, T. (1985). Piaget, stone tools and the evolution of human intelligence.
World Archaeology, 17, No. 1 (pp. 32-43).
14
